Machine learning models deployed on the cloud are susceptible to several security threats including extraction attacks. Adversaries may abuse a model's prediction API to steal the model thus compromising model confidentiality, privacy of training data, and revenue from future query payments. This work introduces a model extraction monitor that quantifies the extraction status of models by continually observing the API query and response streams of users. We present two novel strategies that measure either the information gain or the coverage of the feature space spanned by user queries to estimate the learning rate of individual and colluding adversaries. Both approaches have low computational overhead and can easily be offered as services to model owners to warn them against state of the art extraction attacks. We demonstrate empirical performance results of these approaches for decision tree and neural network models using open source datasets and BigML MLaaS platform.
INTRODUCTION
Most cloud service providers (CSPs) now offer services that enable developers to train and host machine learning (ML) models on the cloud. Application developers or end users can access these models via prediction APIs on a pay-per-query basis. Recent work has shown that hosted ML models are susceptible to subversion attacks including evasion, poisoning, and extraction. In an evasion attack, an adversary forces a deployed model to misclassify by making imperceptible perturbations to the input samples [2, 4, 9, 19, 22] . In a poisoning attack, adversaries attempt to deliberately influence the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ACSAC '18, December 3-7, 2018, San Juan, PR, USA © 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6569-7/18/12. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3274694.3274740 training data with the aim to manipulate the outcomes when models are periodically updated with new data [3, 16, 17] . In an extraction attack, adversaries abuse a model's query API and launch a series of intelligent queries to steal the hosted model, thus avoiding future query payments [25] . Moreover, access to model parameters obtained via extraction, can leak sensitive private information about the model and its training data and facilitate evasion attacks especially if the model is utilized in security applications such as malware or spam classification [1, 6, 7] . As more applications rely on ML models for automated decision making, model subversion attacks pose substantial security risks to these applications in real world settings. This work is focussed towards model extraction attacks and enables model owners to continuously gauge the knowledge gained by users over time with increasing number of API calls.
Machine learning models commonly encapsulate confidential information pertaining to the problem domain. For instance, the business logic of a banking firm is encoded in the model that predicts if a customer is eligible for a loan or insurance. Additionally, the training data used to construct the model may be private and expensive to gather. For instance, a significant number of expensive clinical trials and private health records may have been utilized to train a model that predicts the health of a patient. As a consequence, techniques to detect or prevent ongoing model extraction attacks are of significant importance to model owners and cloud service providers. Additionally, knowing the status of model extraction can help price queries as a function of extraction status and aid in making decisions regarding packaging models at an attractive price within a cloud subscription service.
Prior work [25] on model theft has shown that parametric ML models such as linear and logistic regression can be replicated (i.e. inverted) using a constant number of queries which are of the order of number of features, by solving a system of linear equations. For non-parametric models such as decision trees (DT) and their variants (e.g. random forest) or for those with a large number of parameters such as neural networks (NN), the number of queries needed to invert the model is variable and efficient attack strategies may be designed to successively steal the models over time. The focus of this work is to provide extraction status warnings for such ML models in the presence of both individual and colluding adversaries. Figure 1 depicts the problem setting with different stakeholders. Model owners deploy their models on the cloud, which are accessed by end users via pay-per-query APIs. The CSP manages the query and response streams from each user to the deployed ML models. In order to detect extraction attacks from adversaries, we design a cloudbased extraction monitor that continually informs model owners of the knowledge gained by users based on the API calls made thus far. The extraction monitor has at least a partial visibility of the deployed model in order to provide such a status, with estimation quality improving with better visibility.
We propose two strategies that the extraction monitor can use to continuously infer the model learning rate of users. In strategy 1, the monitor trains and maintains a running proxy model corresponding to each user with increasing number of queries to the source model. The proxy model is used to estimate the knowledge gained by a user relative to a validation set supplied by the model owner, wherein the distribution of the validation set is similar to the train set. A significant amount of computational effort may be spent to train and update a model per user with each new query. Therefore a lightweight DT model is used as a running proxy model at the monitor to estimate the knowledge gained by a user. DTs are easy to update continually and we define a novel information gain metric that can be used to assess their knowledge.
Strategy 2 overcomes the time and space complexity challenges associated with strategy 1. In this approach, the monitor maintains compact summaries of user queries and estimates their learning rate by computing the feature space covered by these queries relative to the class boundaries induced by the source model. Therefore, with each new query the monitor simply updates an efficient query summary of the corresponding user and no models are trained. One of the challenges in applying this approach is that the class boundaries of complex models such as neural networks are not always accessible. Therefore in our approach, the model owner supplies a surrogate DT model along with the original source model, which is built using knowledge distillation [5] and has high fidelity with respect to the source model. As class boundaries of DT models are easily accessible via their leaf nodes, the surrogate DT model is used to estimate the learning rate of users while the source model is used for predictions.
Strategies 1 and 2 can be used to estimate the knowledge gained by individual adversaries with increasing number of API calls. However, multiple adversaries can collude together to invert a model at a faster rate. To efficiently estimate the learning rate of groups of colluding adversaries, we propose two greedy algorithms corresponding to both strategies, which allow us to efficiently search a k-sized group of users who have maximum knowledge of the model among all users of the model API. In particular, the key contributions of our work are as follows:
• We propose two novel strategies that use proxy or surrogate decision tree models to measure the knowledge gained by both individual and colluding adversaries with increasing number of queries to the deployed source model. We consider two categories of users who are either always legitimate or always adversarial and we do not distinguish between the types of queries made by users. • We define an information gain metric that tracks the knowledge gained by a running decision tree with increasing amount of training data. The metric is based on entropy and measures the learning rate of an evolving decision tree with respect to a validation set provided by the model owner. The information gain metric is used by strategy 1 to track the extraction status of a user with increasing number of API calls. We present a fast greedy algorithm that computes the maximum knowledge gained by any set of k users among all users who queried the model, which may be used in the presence of colluding adversaries. • We define a coverage metric that uses the user's API calls to compute the coverage of the input feature space relative to the class boundaries induced by the deployed source model. The coverage metric is used by strategy 2 to track the extraction status of a user with increasing number of API calls. Strategy 2 maintains compact summaries of user query streams, which only require constant space and time complexity to store and update so that the knowledge gained by colluding adversaries can be computed efficiently using a greedy approach. • We present experimental evaluation results for both approaches using open source datasets and models deployed on BigML MLaaS platform. The datasets include structured data with both continuous and categorical variables, wherein the number of features vary from 7 37. We present model extraction results for two attack strategies: random queries and an intelligent path finding algorithm from prior work.
Outline. The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the problem framework and section 4 presents two different approaches to compute model extraction status for both individual and colluding users. The experimental results with open source datasets are presented in section 5. Lastly, section 6 outlines the summary along with some of the limitations and avenues for future work.
RELATED WORK
Kumar et. al [13] present a survey of adversarial attacks on machine learning models including evasion, poisoning, and extraction. Most of the existing literature on model extraction focuses on model stealing or inversion attacks that divulge model parameters or sensitive private information about the training data to adversaries querying the model [1, 6, 7, 25] . Tramer et al. [25] demonstrates extraction attacks on popular model classes such as linear and logistic regression, neural networks, and decision trees. For linear and logistic regression models, the deployed model can be inverted from query response pairs by solving a system of linear equations. For non-linear models such as kernel SVMs, the authors extend the attack proposed by [14] . For decision tree models, a decision tree path finding attack is proposed to extract rule sets associated with the leaf nodes of the deployed decision tree. For neural network models, the adversary generates random queries to the source model that span the input feature space and uses these samples to train a local model. Authors conduct a number of experiments to show that adversaries are able to successfully learn a model equivalent to the source model, with increasing number of API calls.
Model extraction also helps facilitate evasion attacks in applications such as spam filtering and anomaly or malware detection [2, 11, 14] . In [14] , authors formally define an adversarial classifier reverse engineering problem of finding low cost input instances that can fool a deployed classifier based on a cost function defined over the instance space. In [18] , authors demonstrate a two-step attack where an adversary first launches an extraction attack on a deployed NN model and trains a local NN model using synthetically generated inputs which are labeled by the deployed NN. The local substitute model is then used to craft adversarial samples which are misclassified by the deployed NN. This is possible since adversarial samples generated for model evasion exhibit cross model and cross dataset generalization characteristics [24] . While in [25] , the objective is to replicate the source model with high accuracy, the objective in both [14] and [18] is to construct input instances that can evade the source classifier without necessarily learning its entire decision surface. In [18] , authors propose an efficient Jacobian-based dataset augmentation attack that attempts to learn approximate decision boundaries of the source model using few API calls. Authors demonstrate that substitute models learnt using this approach are effective in crafting adversarial inputs that can successfully fool the source model. In our work, model extraction rate is measured using metrics defined in [25] , which are based on the accuracy of the extracted model and the strategies proposed to measure extraction status are independent of specific extraction attack techniques.
In [26] , authors study the problem of inverting hyperparameters of a trained ML model, which weigh loss function and the regularization terms. Authors consider linear and logistic regression models, SVMs and NNs and assume that the knowledge of training data and algorithm is available. In [10, 15] , authors present techniques to combine NN models, which may be used by adversaries to collude for model extraction. Although several model extraction and evasion techniques have been proposed and analyzed, we know of no prior work that estimates the model extraction status corresponding to individual or colluding adversaries and provides warnings to model owners, which is the focus of our work.
One of the limitations of neural network models is that they are blackbox and non-interpretable in nature. Therefore several global model interpretability techniques have been proposed to extract comprehensible, symbolic representations from trained neural networks using knowledge extraction or distillation [5, 8, 12, 21, 23] . In this work, we leverage the TREPAN [5] algorithm to produce a surrogate decision tree model from a trained neural network that has high fidelity with the source model. In strategy 2, the surrogate DT model is used by the extraction monitor to access the approximate decision boundaries induced by the source neural network model.
PROBLEM FRAMEWORK
An MLaaS subscription allows ML developers to train a model based on their data and deploy it on the cloud. End users query the model using its prediction APIs. We regard an ML model as a function f : X ! that maps a d-dimensional input feature vector x i 2 X to a prediction i 2 , which is a categorical variable.
Model Extraction Attack. In the case of model extraction attacks, an adversary abuses the prediction API of a model f and attempts to learn a modelf that achieves similar performance as the deployed source model f . For instance, the deployed source model may be a DT. An adversary may query the DT multiple times with different inputs and obtain labelled data that he uses to train a NN (or any other model).
The metrics proposed in this work to estimate the model extraction status of deployed models are independent of the specific attack techniques used by adversaries to generate a sequence of queries. However, we evaluate our work against two state of the art attack strategies proposed in the literature. In a random attack, an adversary generates query inputs uniformly at random to cover the feature space. Random attacks are generally targeted towards deployed NN models. In the decision tree path-finding attack proposed by [25] , the adversary generates queries targeted towards deployed DT models and attempts to learn the rule sets associated with leaf nodes of the DT model. Adversary Model. In our work, the adversary can be a single user or a group of colluding users that have access to the ML model's prediction API. Furthermore, we assume that adversaries may have knowledge of the model type (e.g. a DT or NN) and the type of data it is trained upon with the objective of learning the ML model's parameters via a sequence of intelligent queries.
Performance Metrics. In order to compare the performance of a modelf learnt by an adversary with respect to the deployed source model f , we compute the R test metric formulated by [25] . Note that the monitor does not have access to any models learnt by the adversaries, but simply their queries. While building the source model f , the model owner generally splits the dataset into train (d tr ain ) and test (d test ) sets. The test dataset d test is used to compare the performance of a learnt model.
where I denotes the indicator function. Thus 1 R test represents the accuracy of an adversary's model with respect to the deployed source model. In addition to testing the adversary's model on the test dataset which follows a specific distribution, the learnt model can also be tested against a dataset U that is generated uniformly from the input feature space. Therefore R unif represents an alternate metric to evaluate the performance an adversary's model as compared to the deployed model.
In general, the performance of ML models on the test dataset d test and random dataset U may vary as these belong to different distributions. However, in our experiments, the difference between R test and R unif was marginal and therefore we present the empirical evaluation results with respect to R test in section 5.
Our goal is to design a cloud-based monitor capable of providing model extraction status and warnings. Each query to a deployed ML model f along with its prediction response leaks a certain amount of information about the decision boundaries of the model to the user. After having made multiple queries, an adversarial user can train his own ML modelf over the query-response set, which has a certain performance accuracy as compared to the source model f . Our objective is to detect if any set of users of size k 1 can jointly reconstruct a model that yields an accuracy beyond a given threshold. The model owner may run the detection at fixed time intervals or after a certain number of queries have been answered by the deployed model. In subsequent sections, we focus on deployed DT and NN models for classification and propose two strategies to detect model extraction by adversarial users.
Strategy 1: Providing model extraction warnings using information gain metric
Initialization. In this strategy, we assume that the model owner provides an extraction threshold t and a validation set S to the monitor. The monitor observes the query response pairs of each user and incrementally trains and maintains a proxy DT based on these pairs. The distribution of the validation set is assumed to be similar to the train dataset, with each element having an input x and an associated class label 2 [k]. Let p i denote the probability that a random element chosen from S belongs to the class i. Then the entropy of S is defined by:
Information gain metric of a decision tree. Recall that the information gain of an attribute is defined as the reduction in entropy of a training dataset when we partition it based on the values that the attribute can take [20] . We generalize this concept and define a metric called the information gain metric of a DT T with respect to a given validation set S. This metric is essentially computed by the monitor on its local DT to estimate the information gained by users based on their queries issued thus far. By evaluating S on T , let S be partitioned into disjoint subsets {S l } by the leaf nodes of T . The information gain of T is defined as the reduction in entropy as follows:
where the entropy of a leaf node l i.e. E (S l ) is computed using the original class labels of the elements in the validation set. Similarly, one can apply Eq. (4) to compute the information gain of the model owner's source DT T O as IG tr ee (S,T O ). Figure 2 plots the performance of a DT trained by the end user as measured by R test and R unif metrics and compares these against the information gain metric with increasing amount of training data. We observe that information gain exhibits an approximately linear relationship with R test and R unif metrics and could be used to capture the learning rate of the user's model. 
Model owners are provided with an extraction warning whenever the extraction status of users querying the model exceeds a given threshold t.
Model Extraction Status with Collusion. In a general setting, a model owner would like to know if any k of the n users accessing the deployed model are colluding to extract it. We extend our existing approach to compute the model extraction warning in case of collusion as follows.
In a brute force approach, a monitor would need to compute the extraction status for all ⇣ n k ⌘ combinations of users. Thus the monitor would need to compute the information gain of each subset of k users using their queries and choose the subset that has the highest gain. However, the complexity of this algorithm is exponential in n. To overcome this problem, we propose a greedy algorithm which at each step selects the user whose query set in combination with queries of currently selected users yields a DT that has the highest information gain. Algorithm 1 gives the pseudo-code for the greedy method. The algorithm needs a parameter k and the query history of all n users as input and returns a set of k users that jointly have the highest information about the model along with their extraction status. The greedy algorithm requires O (nk ) computations of the information gain metric. Due to the iterative approach used to construct a set of k users, the greedy algorithm also computes smaller subsets of sizes 1..k 1 users, each of whom have maximum knowledge of the model. In practice, the number of adversaries k is small compared to the total number of users n and therefore the algorithm can scale to a large number of users. In section 5.2, we compare greedy against its brute force counterpart for small sets of users, where the computation of optimal solution is tractable. 
Quality of Model Extraction Warning. We present experimental results of model extraction warnings on real datasets in Sec. 5, which shed light on the accuracy of the extraction status. One of the factors that impacts the quality of warning is the classification accuracy of the validation set. If the validation set is not accurately classified by T O , it may contain less information and all the samples in the validation set may belong to a few classes only. To avoid this, the validation set may be assigned an information content score as follows:
Score (S ) = IG tr ee (d tr ain , DecisionTree (S ))/E(d tr ain ) (6) where d tr ain is the training set confidential to the model owner. The model owner scores the validation set using the above rule before handing it to the monitor. The score can thus be used to assign a confidence value to the model extraction status estimates.
Strategy 2: Providing model extraction warnings using coverage metric
Initialization. In the previous strategy, the monitor stores historical queries of all users accessing a model and maintains running DTs on a combination of these queries. This can be computationally expensive if the number of users and queries are large. We now propose a novel approach that overcomes these challenges. In strategy 2, the monitor maintains and updates a compact query summary corresponding to each user with increasing number of queries. Each user's query summary effectively encompasses the boundaries of regions within the feature space that the user may have learnt for each class. The monitor assesses the coverage of summaries with respective to the class boundaries induced by the source model in order to compute the overall learning rate of a user.
To achieve this, the model owner deploys two models: the original source model used for predictions and an additional surrogate DT model obtained from the source model via knowledge distillation [5] . The surrogate DT is used solely by the monitor to access the approximate class boundaries induced by the source model. For each API call, the end user receives the prediction i.e. class label corresponding to the input sample from the source model as usual. However, the monitor receives both the class label as well as the leaf id to which the input sample was mapped from the surrogate DT. Additionally, if there are C output classes in the model, the monitor obtains the class probabilities of the surrogate DT i.e. probability p i that a sample from training data maps to class i and the hypervolume of each class (Class_Vol i , explained in next subsection).
For ease of exposition and to simplify the notation, the next subsection assumes that the deployed source model is a DT so that the monitor obtains both the class labels and the leaf id corresponding to each prediction simply from the source model. If the source model is not a DT (e.g. NN), then the monitor obtains the class label and the leaf id corresponding to each input query sample from the surrogate DT model. For ease of exposition, we present a simple example. Consider a deployed DT model with F = 2 training features, L = 7 leaf nodes, and C = 5 classes. Let the class labels and decision boundaries created by the leaf nodes be as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Let users A and B query this deployed model. Then, Fig. 3 (b) and 3(c) show the user queries as points in the feature space along with the rectangular summaries stored by the monitor for each leaf node.
Algorithm 2 updateModelSummaries
Input: U serID, Query q = q 1 q 2 · · · q |f | Output: create/update user summary corresponding to leaf i:
abs (M (i, j).max M (i, j).min)
Then, the coverage of each class is computed by aggregating the coverage for all leaves within the same class and the extraction status per class is computed as the ratio of class coverage to the hypervolume of the corresponding class of the source model (note that the monitor has access to the hypervolume of each class in the source model) as follows:
Finally, the extraction status of a user is computed as a weighted sum of per-class extraction status by weighing each term with the class probability p i .
Model owners are provided with a warning whenever the extraction status of users exceeds a given threshold t. The threshold t to generate warnings can be adaptively set based on the value associated with the accuracy of the model. For instance, some models are valuable only if their accuracy is high. In such cases, the threshold for extraction warning can be set at a high level. On the other hand, expensive models, such as those in healthcare, may be valuable even at medium levels of accuracy and for these the warning threshold can be set at a lower level. In order to react to extraction attacks in a timely manner (before its too late), the change in extraction status can be monitored over periodic intervals and if there are sudden step increases in extraction status, warnings can be generated. Similarly, prediction models can be built to forecast the extraction status of future time intervals to generate warnings ahead of time.
Model Extraction Status with Collusion. As discussed previously for Strategy 1, a model owner may be interested in knowing the joint extraction status for k users who may be colluding. Here again, we use a greedy approach to compute the set of k users with maximum knowledge of the model in polynomial time. The only difference in the algorithm is that during the user selection step, the monitor chooses a user such that the combined model summary has the maximum hypervolume instead of maximum information gain. Fig. 3(d 
EXPERIMENTS
This section presents experimental performance results for the two model extraction warning strategies outlined in Section 4. The results are presented for both individual as well as colluding adversaries.
We first study the case where the deployed source model is a DT. We simulate two attack strategies that are employed by adversaries: (i) Random query attack: This is a naive strategy wherein adversaries generate random queries spanning the input space and obtain predictions from the deployed model. The adversaries then use the queryprediction pairs to train local DTs in order to steal the deployed model. (ii) Decision tree path-finding algorithm (Tramer attack): This is a more sophisticated attack approach proposed by [25] to specifically steal DT models. Here an adversary generates input samples to recursively search for the rule sets corresponding to each leaf node of the deployed tree. It leverages the fact that DT prediction APIs generally return leaf ids along with predicted class labels. To remain consistent with prior work and present results corresponding to models deployed on MLaaS platforms, we use BigML's DT APIs. The model owner uses these APIs to train and deploy a DT. The adversaries abuse the API to launch extraction attacks. We assume that adversaries are aware of the feature space in order to generate intelligent queries. However, the monitor is agnostic to any attack strategies employed by the adversaries. We use the BigML and UCI machine learning repository datasets listed in table 1 for experimentation including the datasets used in prior work. The IRS model predicts a US state, based on administrative tax records. The Steak and GSS models respectively predict a person's preferred steak preparation and happiness level, from the survey and demographic data. The Email Importance model predicts whether Gmail classifies an email as 'important' or not, given message metadata. The Adult dataset predicts whether the income of an adult exceeds $50K/yr based on census data (this dataset is also known as the Census Income dataset). Wine Quality dataset contains samples of white vinho verde wine and predicts the quality of wine as a score between 0 and 10. The Heart Disease dataset contains records of patients from Cleveland, Hungary, Switzerland, and the VA Long Beach and the goal of the ML model is to predict the presence of heart disease in patients.
The original DT models for IRS, Steak, GSS and Email Importance datasets have been trained and deployed on BigML by authors of [25] . We use these pre-trained models in our experiments. The validation set for strategy 1 is chosen randomly from training data and varies between 5-10% of the dataset size. 
Model extraction status for source DT Models
Recall that in strategy 1, the monitor trains and maintains proxy DT models for each user and computes the information gain metric. In strategy 2, the monitor maintains compact query summaries corresponding to each user to estimate the coverage metric. Since the source model is already a DT, no surrogate model is used.
Model extraction status for individual adversaries. Figure 4 plots the extraction status output by the monitor using the two proposed strategies and compares these with the performance of the model learnt by the adversary using 1 R test with increasing number of queries. In each case, we observe that the 1 R test steadily increases when the adversary launches the Tramer attack to recover the rule sets of all leaf nodes (i.e. "User RS(Tramer)"). However, the performance of an adversary's DT learnt from random queries varies across datasets as the distribution of random queries and training data may vary (i.e. "Monitor/User DT(Rand)"). In strategy 1, the monitor maintains a running DT to compute the information gain with respect to the validation set. When strategy 1 is used to estimate learning rate of the user model based on Tramer attack, we observe that the initial extraction status is high ("Strategy 1(Tramer)") as the Tramer attack only recovers the rule sets of leaves sequentially without attempting to utilize any other benefit from the generated queries. In contrast, the monitor attempts to quantify the knowledge gained from the generated queries using a DT and therefore estimates a higher extraction status. The 1 R test performance of monitor's DT is shown under "Monitor DT(Tramer)", while the corresponding extraction status is shown under "Strategy1(Tramer)". For higher number of queries, monitor's extraction status based on strategy 1 better matches the 1 R test of the adversary's model based on Tramer attack (i.e. "User RS(Tramer)"). We also observe that the 1 R test of the DT constructed by the monitor can sometimes yield a lower value due to the difference in distribution of training set and the queries generated by Tramer attack. In case of strategy 2, we observe that the extraction status more closely matches the 1 R test for models learnt by the adversary using random queries ("Strategy 2(Rand)") as well as Tramer attack queries ("Strategy 2(Tramer)" ). In this case, the monitor maintains compact model summaries based on the span of the input space and therefore is less impacted by the distribution of queries generated by either Tramer attack or Random queries. Figure 4(d) plots results only for strategy 1 as the dataset includes several categorical features while strategy 2 is more suited for continuous features.
Model extraction status for colluding adversaries. Figure 5 plots the extraction status output by the monitor for the case of colluding The model extraction status is generated using strategy 2 when any k 2 {1, 3, 5} users are colluding (k = 1 implies single adversarial user). As expected, when the number of colluding users increase, the extraction status increases consistently during all times of the attack. For example, Fig. 5 (a) top plot shows that when 1000 queries are processed from each user, the extraction status for individual adversarial users (k = 1) is 28%. For k = 3 and k = 5 adversarial users, the status is 51% and 69% respectively. Similarly the bottom plots consider the setting of n = 10 users launching simultaneous Random attacks. The model extraction status is generated using strategy 1 when any k 2 {1, 3, 5} users are colluding. As discussed above, a similar increase in the extraction status occurs as the number of colluding users increases.
Model extraction status for source NN Models
We now present results for deployed NN models wherein adversaries use the random attack strategy to steal these models. To consider the setting where adversaries may or may not know the model type, we assume that each adversary trains 2 models in parallel: a DT and a NN based on responses of queries on the model's API.
Extraction status using Stategy 1. In strategy 1, the monitor trains and maintains proxy DT models to compute the extraction status based on the information gain metric. It uses the greedy algorithm to obtain the extraction status corresponding to colluding users. Figure 6 shows benchmark results using the steak dataset for the case of individual adversaries (k=1) and colluding adversaries (k=7) querying a 3-layer sklearn NN model having 100 activations (relu) in the hidden layer.
In case of individual adversaries, the top left plot shows two curves: 'Monitor' and 'Opt' over increasing number of queries. 'Opt' 2 Note that the number of users or colluding adversaries is not a limiting factor in our experiments. However, in practice, adversaries form a small fraction of the overall user population plots the extraction status of the adversary that has maximum knowledge (obtained via combinatorial search) while 'Monitor' shows the extraction status of the adversary computed by the greedy algorithm. We observe that greedy performs close to combinatorially chosen optimal. The bottom left plot shows two curves: 'OptUserDT' and 'Op-tUserNN' over increasing number of queries. 'OptUserDT' shows the performance of the running DT model trained by the adversary that has the maximum knowledge. Similarly, 'OptUserNN' shows the performance of the running NN model trained by the adversary that has the maximum knowledge. We observe that the performance of NN model trained by the adversary is higher for a given number of queries as it matches the source model type. Next, we observe that the extraction status computed by the monitor ('Monitor') closely matches the performance of the adversary's model ('OptUserNN').
The next pair of plots for k = 7 show results for colluding adversaries. For instance, the top right plot shows that the extraction status for k = 7 users computed by greedy ('Monitor') closely matches the extraction status of the optimal set of k = 7 users computed via combinatorial search ('Opt'). The bottom right plot shows the performance of the NN and DT trained using responses of k adversaries that have maximum knowledge. As before, we observe that the performance of NN is higher for a given number of queries as it matches the source model type. Next, we observe that the extraction status computed by the monitor ('Monitor') closely matches the performance of the NN model constructed by the k colluding adversaries ('OptUserNN').
Extraction status using Stategy 2. In strategy 2, the model owner deploys a surrogate DT model along with the source NN model. The surrogate DT model is built using knowledge distillation techniques and expected to have high fidelity with the source NN model. Specifically, in our experiments, we use the distillation approach proposed in [5] . The end users and adversaries receive predictions from the source NN model while monitor receives the class label and the leaf id corresponding to each prediction from the surrogate DT in order to compute the coverage metric.
The source model is a 4-layer NN model comprising of an input layer followed by 2 dense hidden layers, each with 16 sigmoidactivations, followed by a softmax output layer. The fidelity of the surrogate DT models with respect to the source models for the 3 datasets are as follows: Adult: 99.54, Wine Quality: 90.06, Heart Disease: 100. The adversary uses random query attack, which is the known state of the art model extraction attack against deployed NN models [25] . To consider the setting where adversaries may or may not know the source model configuration, we assume that each adversary simultaneously trains multiple models and the model with the highest accuracy will be considered as the stolen replica of the source model. In our experiments, the adversary trains 3 separate NN models and a DT model. The DT model used by the adversary is a default sklearn DT model. The configurations of the adversary's NN models are as follows :
• NN 1 : The first model is a 3-layer NN comprising of an input layer followed by a hidden layer with 16 sigmoid activations and a softmax output layer. • NN 2 : The second model has same configuration as the source NN model. • NN 3 : The third model is a 5-layer NN comprising of an input layer followed by 3 hidden layers, each with 16 sigmoid activations, followed by the softmax output layer. Figure 7 shows the benchmark results using the Adult, Wine Quality and Heart Disease datasets respectively for the case of individual adversaries. Each figure plots seven curves over increasing number of queries. The 'Source NN' curve shows the accuracy of the source NN model while the 'Surrogate DT' curve shows the accuracy of the surrogate source DT model. We observe that the surrogate DT models obtained via knowledge distillation have high fidelity with respect to the source NN models across all 3 datasets. The 'Adv NN1', 'Adv NN2' and 'Adv NN3' curves plot the accuracy of the adversary's NN models trained using randomly generated synthetic input samples and labels learned using the source NN model's prediction API. The 'Adv DT' curve plots the accuracy of the adversary's DT model. As expected, the adversary's DT model generally has lower accuracy as compared to its more complex NN models. Finally, the 'Monitor Ext Status' curve shows the performance of the extraction status computed by the monitor using the coverage metric based on the surrogate DT model and the adversary's query inputs.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Machine learning models are susceptible to subversion attacks including evasion, poisoning, and extraction. Adversaries may steal deployed models and compromise model confidentiality, API revenue, and privacy of training data. As the commercial adoption of ML services hastens and machine learning models being used to increasingly make automated decisions, detection and prevention of these attacks becomes ever more important.
In this work, we presented the design of a cloud-based extraction monitor that can inform model owners about the status of model extraction by both individual and colluding adversaries in the context of source DT and NN models. We proposed two novel metrics to infer the model learning rate of adversarial users. The first metric is based on entropy and measures the information gain of a proxy DT with respect to a validation set provided by the model owner. The first metric relies on training and maintaining a proxy DT for each user which can be computationally expensive. The second metric is based on maintaining compact query summaries of users and computing their coverage of the input space relative to the partitions induced by the source model. The second metric relies on a surrogate DT model obtained from the source model via knowledge distillation and incurs low space and time overhead at the monitor. Both these metrics may also be used within a greedy algorithm to determine the set of k users who have maximum knowledge of the model in the presence of collusion. We evaluated these metrics using two known attack techniques on a number of open source datasets. Our experimental results show that these metrics can provide approximate information about the knowledge learnt by adversarial users with increasing number of queries and can be used to warn model owners about ongoing attacks.
There are a number of important directions for future work. Firstly, our work has mainly focussed on two types of deployed models: decision trees and neural networks. Future work will evaluate the performance of the proposed approaches on a larger variety of source ML models (e.g. kernel SVMs, random forests, and gradient boosted trees) and non-random attack techniques (e.g. Jacobian-based dataset augmentation attack [18] ). One of the limitations of our approach is the dependence on decision tree models to monitor the extraction status. This may pose challenges for high dimensional datasets when the knowledge of complex models such as neural networks needs to be distilled to a decision tree. Future work will study this problem and conduct experiments with datasets of higher dimensions and larger number of users who may each be using different attack techniques.
An important direction for further investigation is to study techniques that may be used by individual or colluding adversaries to avoid detection. For instance, adversaries may use a mixture of genuine and extraction queries and thus avoid detection by forcing the extraction status to grow at a slow rate. One way to address this problem is to analyze query patterns of users, for example by monitoring how the coverage of queries grows with each new query in strategy 2. A related avenue for future work is to define alternate metrics to measure extraction status. In our work, extraction status attempts to capture the running accuracy of an adversary's model. However, techniques proposed in [14, 18] use extraction attacks to approximate decision boundaries for launching evasion attacks. Although these techniques may yield substitute models with low accuracy, they can still be used to launch successful evasion attacks. Therefore coverage metrics based on the proximity of input instances to decision boundaries can be designed to help capture the knowledge gained by adversaries for evasion.
Another interesting direction is to study the applicability of the proposed approaches to help detect extraction attacks that steal model hyperparameters. Lastly, it will be valuable to design defensive strategies to guard machine learning models against extraction attacks and develop information theoretic metrics that can quantify the loss of privacy of training data from such attacks.
